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  "label": "Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), OJ L 12.7.2024",
  "file": "eu_ai_act_2024_1689.pdf",
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  "definition": "(1) ‘AI system’ means a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments; (2) ‘risk’ means the combination of the probability of an occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm; (3) ‘provider’ means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body that develops an AI system or a general-purpose AI model or that has an AI system or a general-purpose AI model developed and pl"
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  "label": "NIST AI 100-1, AI RMF 1.0 (Jan 2023)",
  "file": "nist_ai_100_1.pdf",
  "pages": 48,
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  "definition": null
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 "omb_m2521": {
  "label": "OMB M-25-21 (Apr 3, 2025)",
  "file": "omb_m_25_21.pdf",
  "pages": 25,
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    "kwic": "cant injury to humans; d. Transport, safety, design, development, or use of hazardous chemicals or biological agents; e. Design, construction, or testing of equipment, systems, or public infrastructure that would pose a signif"
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  ],
  "definition": null
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 "usc_9401": {
  "label": "15 U.S.C. 9401 (LII)",
  "file": "usc_15_9401.html",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 52192,
  "counts": {
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  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. Donald J. Trump. Ex. Ord. No. 14318. Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Inf"
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Energy "
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Commerc"
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    "kwic": "h datasets, developed over decades of Federal investments—to train scientific foundation models and create AI agents to test new hypotheses, automate research workflows, and accelerate scientific breakthroughs. The Genesis Mis"
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    "kwic": "large-scale model training, simulation, and inference; (ii) AI modeling and analysis frameworks, including AI agents to explore design spaces, evaluate experimental outcomes, and automate workflows; (iii) computational tools, "
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    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Energy "
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    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Commerc"
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  "label": "Colorado SB 24-205 (signed 2024)",
  "file": "colorado_sb24_205.pdf",
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  "definition": "\"ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM\" MEANS ANY MACHINE-BASED SYSTEM THAT, FOR ANY EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT OBJECTIVE, INFERS FROM THE INPUTS THE SYSTEM RECEIVES HOW TO GENERATE OUTPUTS, INCLUDING CONTENT, DECISIONS, PREDICTIONS, OR RECOMMENDATIONS, THAT CAN INFLUENCE PHYSICAL OR VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS. (3) \"CONSEQUENTIAL DECISION\" MEANS A DECISION THAT HAS A MATERIAL LEGAL OR SIMILARLY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE PROVISION OR DENIAL TO ANY CONSUMER OF, OR THE COST OR TERMS OF: (a) EDUCATION ENROLLMENT OR AN EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY; (b) EMPLOYMENT OR AN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY; (C) A FINANCIAL OR LENDING SERV"
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 "california_sb53": {
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  "file": "california_sb53.html",
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    "kwic": "opriation in a budget act, or other measure, for its purposes. (3) Existing law prohibits employers and their agents from making, adopting, or enforcing a rule, regulation, or policy preventing an employee from disclosing info"
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 "texas_hb149": {
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  "definition": "\"Artificial intelligence system\" means any machine-based system that, for any explicit or implicit objective, infers from the inputs the system receives how to generate outputs, including content, decisions, predictions, or recommendations, that can influence physical or virtual environments. (2)AA\"Consumer\" means an individual who is a resident of this state acting only in an individual or household context. The term does not include an individual acting in a commercial or employment context. (3)AA\"Council\" means the Texas Artificial Intelligence Council established under Chapter 554. Sec.A55"
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  "file": "utah_sb149_2024_enrolled.pdf",
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  "definition": "\"Generative artificial intelligence\" means an artificial system that: 44 (i) is trained on data; 45 (ii) interacts with a person using text, audio, or visual communication; and 46 (iii) generates non-scripted outputs similar to outputs created by a human, with 47 limited or no human oversight. 48 (b) \"License\" means a state-granted authorization for a person to engage in a specified 49 occupation: 50 (i) based on the person meeting personal qualifications established under state law; 51 and 52 (ii) where state law requires the authorization before the person may lawfully engage 53 in the occup"
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  "label": "Commission Guidelines on the definition of an AI system, C(2025) 5053 final (29.7.2025)",
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  "definition": "seven main elements: (1) a machine-based system; (2) that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy; (3) that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment; (4) and that, for explicit or implicit objectives; (5) infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs (6) such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions (7) that can influence physical or virtual environments"
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 "ndaa_238g": {
  "label": "Pub. L. 115-232 sec. 238(g), 132 Stat. 1697-98 (the definition OMB M-25-21 adopts)",
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    "kwic": " any covered nation; or ``(B) any third party that the Secretary reasonably believes is acting as a broker or agent for a covered nation or an entity in a covered nation. ``(b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) shall apply to pr"
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    "kwic": "Program Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability/ Credentialing Executive Agent shall establish and implement a program (to be known as th"
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    "kwic": "on- critical positions. (c) Security Executive Agent Defined.--In this section, the term ``Security Executive Agent'' means the Director of National Intelligence acting as the Security Executive Agent in accordance with Execu"
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    "kwic": "gn principal.--The term `foreign principal' has the meaning given such term in section 1(b)(1) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(b)(1)). ``(2) United states-based foreign media outlet.--The term `Un"
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    "kwic": "programming distributor (as defined in such section) to consumers in the United States; and ``(B) would be an agent of a foreign principal (as defined in paragraph (1)) for purposes of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1"
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " and Technical Training School' (in this section referred to as the `School'). ``(b) Designation of Executive Agent.--The Secretary of Defense shall designate the Secretary of a military department as the Department of Defens"
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "r working capital and revolving funds, as specified in the funding table in section 4501. SEC. 1402. CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION, DEFENSE. (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Funds are hereby authorized to be a"
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    "kwic": "f Defense for [[Page 132 STAT. 2090]] fiscal year 2019 for expenses, not otherwise provided for, for Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Defense, as specified in the funding table in section 4501. (b) Use.--Amounts auth"
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    "kwic": "uthorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) are authorized for-- (1) the destruction of lethal chemical agents and munitions in accordance with section 1412 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C."
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    "kwic": "onals ``(a) Standards and Process.--(1) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Security Executive Agent established pursuant to Executive Order 13467 (73 Fed. Reg. 38103; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note), shall develop unifor"
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    "kwic": ", Code of Federal Regulations (relating to export and import of nuclear equipment and material). ``(v) Select agents and toxins covered by part 331 of title 7, Code of Federal Regulations, part 121 of title 9 of such Code, or "
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    "kwic": "executing a project under the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the Department of Defense construction agent may recognize the NATO project authorization amounts as budgetary resources to incur obligations for the purp"
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    "kwic": "executing a project under the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the Department of Defense construction agent may recognize the NATO project authorization amounts as budgetary resources to incur obligations for the purp"
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   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "deration to be received under this section be paid, directly or through the Air Force design and construction agent, to the contractors performing design or construction of the real property improvements described in subsecti"
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "nse Act (50 U.S.C. 2652(a)); and (2) the number of such reviews conducted for individuals who are citizens or agents of each country on the sensitive countries list referred to in that section. (f) Definitions.--In this sectio"
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501). SEC. 3137. ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN REPORTS. (a) Report of Owner's Agent on Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Contract.--Section 4446 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act "
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    "kwic": "with respect to an entity-- (I) a minor child; (II) a person acting as a nominee, intermediary, custodian, or agent on behalf of another person; (III) a person acting solely as an employee of the entity and whose control over"
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    "kwic": "LRR). 052 0208099F UNIFIED PLATFORM 29,800 29,800 (UP). 054 0305236F COMMON DATA LINK 41,880 41,880 EXECUTIVE AGENT (CDL EA). 055 0305601F MISSION PARTNER 10,074 10,074 ENVIRONMENTS. 056 0306250F CYBER OPERATIONS 253,825 253,"
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   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " OPERATIONS................. 1,266,200 1,266,200 TOTAL WORKING CAPITAL FUND, DECA... 1,266,200 1,266,200 CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS DESTRUCTION OPERATION & MAINTENANCE............... 105,997 105,997 RDT&E........................."
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "............................... 886,728 886,728 PROCUREMENT........................... 1,091 1,091 TOTAL CHEM AGENTS & MUNITIONS 993,816 993,816 DESTRUCTION........................ DRUG INTERDICTION & CTR-DRUG ACTIVITIES, DEF "
   }
  ],
  "definition": "Artificial Intelligence Defined.--In this section, the term ``artificial intelligence'' includes the following: (1) Any artificial system that performs tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, or that can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets. (2) An artificial system developed in computer software, physical hardware, or other context that solves tasks requiring [[Page 132 STAT. 1698]] human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, communication, or physical action. (3) An artificial system designed to think or act like a human, including cognitive architectures and neural networks. (4) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that is designed to approximate a cognitive task. (5) An artificial system designed to act rationally, including an intelligent software agent or embodied robot that achieves goals using perception, planning, reasoning, learning, communicating, decision making, and ac"
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  "definition": "3.1.1 AI agent automated (3.1.7) entity that senses and responds to its environment and takes actions to achieve its goals 3.1.2 AI component functional element that constructs an AI system (3.1.4) 3."
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    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> (Presidential Sig.) THE WHITE HOUSE, January "
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    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> (Presidential Sig.) THE WHITE HOUSE, April 23"
   }
  ],
  "definition": null
 },
 "eo14363": {
  "label": "EO 14363 Launching the Genesis Mission (Nov 24, 2025), 90 FR 55035",
  "file": "eo14363.txt",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 15305,
  "counts": {
   "agent": 3,
   "agentic": 0,
   "autonom*": 1,
   "AI system": 0
  },
  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " datasets, developed over decades of Federal investments--to train scientific foundation models and create AI agents to test new hypotheses, automate research workflows, and accelerate scientific breakthroughs. The Genesis Mis"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "large-scale model training, simulation, and inference; (ii) AI modeling and analysis frameworks, including AI agents to explore design spaces, evaluate experimental outcomes, and automate workflows; (iii) computational tools, "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "[[Page 55039]] against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Energy."
   }
  ],
  "definition": null
 },
 "eo14365": {
  "label": "EO 14365 National Policy Framework for AI (Dec 11, 2025), 90 FR 58499",
  "file": "eo14365.txt",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 9701,
  "counts": {
   "agent": 1,
   "agentic": 0,
   "autonom*": 0,
   "AI system": 0
  },
  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Commerc"
   }
  ],
  "definition": null
 },
 "eo14409": {
  "label": "EO 14409 Promoting Advanced AI Innovation and Security (Jun 2, 2026)",
  "file": "eo14409.txt",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 8945,
  "counts": {
   "agent": 2,
   "agentic": 0,
   "autonom*": 0,
   "AI system": 0
  },
  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "any other crime. This includes breaching any public or private information technology system, or employing AI agents to unlawfully access data or information that is subsequently used for a criminal or unlawful purpose. Sec. 5"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of War. <G"
   }
  ],
  "definition": null
 },
 "fr_nist_rfi": {
  "label": "NIST/CAISI RFI, Security Considerations for AI Agents, 91 FR 699 (Jan 8, 2026)",
  "file": "fr_nist_rfi_agents.txt",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 19919,
  "counts": {
   "agent": 68,
   "agentic": 2,
   "autonom*": 3,
   "AI system": 3
  },
  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "hnology XRIN 0693-XA002 Request for Information Regarding Security Considerations for Artificial Intelligence Agents AGENCY: Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "thodologies for measuring and improving the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) agent systems. AI agent systems are capable of taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environm"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "asuring and improving the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) agent systems. AI agent systems are capable of taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environments, and may be s"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "practices, case studies, and actionable recommendations based on their experience developing and deploying AI agent systems and managing and anticipating their attendant risks. Responses may inform CAISI's work evaluating the"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "actices to measure and improve the security of AI systems, and other activities related to the security of AI agent systems. DATES: Comments containing information in response to this notice must be received on or before Marc"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " scientific information, and assist industry in improving product quality (15 U.S.C. 272(b-c)). Background AI agent systems are capable of planning and taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environments."
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "tems are capable of planning and taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environments. AI agent systems consist of at least one generative AI model and scaffolding software that equips the model with tools"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " tools to take a range of discretionary actions. These systems may be more expansive, containing multiple sub-agents with software that orchestrates their interactions. They can be deployed with little to no human oversight. O"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "s their interactions. They can be deployed with little to no human oversight. Other terms used to refer to AI agent systems include AI agents and agentic AI. Challenges to the security of AI agent systems may undermine their "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y can be deployed with little to no human oversight. Other terms used to refer to AI agent systems include AI agents and agentic AI. Challenges to the security of AI agent systems may undermine their reliability and lessen the"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "er terms used to refer to AI agent systems include AI agents and agentic AI. Challenges to the security of AI agent systems may undermine their reliability and lessen their utility, stymieing widespread adoption that would ot"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons development and use or other analogous threats). Deployed AI agent systems may face a range of security threats and risks. Some of these risks are shared with other kinds of so"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ver, focuses instead on the novel risks that arise from the use of machine learning models embedded within AI agent systems. Within this category are: (1) security risks that arise from adversarial attacks at either training "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "un to implement technical controls, processes, and other mitigations for the security risks posed by their AI agent systems. In some cases, mitigations draw on cybersecurity best practices, including implementing systems acco"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " architecture. In other cases, risks are addressed with novel approaches, including instruction hierarchy and agent design patterns with trusted models. NIST conducts research and develops guidelines to promote safe and secur"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "safe and secure AI innovation and adoption. Research by CAISI technical staff \\[1]\\ has demonstrated risks of agent hijacking. NIST has also produced resources on this topic including NIST AI 100-2e2025 \\[2]\\ that provides a "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "and NIST AI 800-1 \\[5]\\ that provides guidelines for AI developers to manage risks including the misuse of AI agent systems for offensive [[Page 700]] cybersecurity operations. In addition, NIST SP 800-218A \\[6]\\ provides a p"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "lly. Request for Information This RFI seeks information that can support secure innovation and adoption of AI agent systems. It invites stakeholders--particularly AI agent developers, deployers, and computer security research"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "that can support secure innovation and adoption of AI agent systems. It invites stakeholders--particularly AI agent developers, deployers, and computer security researchers--to share insights on the secure development and dep"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "eployers, and computer security researchers--to share insights on the secure development and deployment of AI agent systems. Such information should be scoped to the security of AI agent systems capable of taking actions that"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ecure development and deployment of AI agent systems. Such information should be scoped to the security of AI agent systems capable of taking actions that affect external state, i.e., persistent changes outside of the AI agen"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "gent systems capable of taking actions that affect external state, i.e., persistent changes outside of the AI agent system itself. Unless contextualized to impact the security of agent systems directly, this RFI does not seek"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "e., persistent changes outside of the AI agent system itself. Unless contextualized to impact the security of agent systems directly, this RFI does not seek general information on generative AI security, insights on practices"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "l-augmented generation systems that are not orchestrated to act autonomously, or feedback on the misuse of AI agent systems to carry out cyberattacks. NIST is requesting that respondents provide information on the topics belo"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "DRESSES sections of this RFI will be considered. 1. Security Threats, Risks, and Vulnerabilities Affecting AI Agent Systems (a) What are the unique security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities currently affecting AI agent syst"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "g AI Agent Systems (a) What are the unique security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities currently affecting AI agent systems, distinct from those affecting traditional software systems? (b) How do security threats, risks, or v"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "raditional software systems? (b) How do security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities vary by model capability, agent scaffold software, tool use, deployment method (including internal vs. external deployment), hosting context "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ge), use case, and otherwise? (c) To what extent are security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities affecting AI agent systems creating barriers to wider adoption or use of AI agent systems? (d) How have these threats, risks, or"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "hreats, risks, or vulnerabilities affecting AI agent systems creating barriers to wider adoption or use of AI agent systems? (d) How have these threats, risks, or vulnerabilities changed over time? How are they likely to evol"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y to evolve in the future? (e) What unique security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities currently affect multi-agent systems, distinct from those affecting singular AI agent systems? 2. Security Practices for AI Agent Systems "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ts, risks, or vulnerabilities currently affect multi-agent systems, distinct from those affecting singular AI agent systems? 2. Security Practices for AI Agent Systems (a) What technical controls, processes, and other practic"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ct multi-agent systems, distinct from those affecting singular AI agent systems? 2. Security Practices for AI Agent Systems (a) What technical controls, processes, and other practices could ensure or improve the security of A"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ystems (a) What technical controls, processes, and other practices could ensure or improve the security of AI agent systems in development and deployment? What is the maturity of these methods in research and in practice? Cat"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": " may include: i. Model-level controls, such as measures to enhance model robustness to prompt injections; ii. Agent system-level controls, such as prompt engineering, data or tool restrictions, and continuous monitoring metho"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "he effectiveness of technical controls, processes, and other practices vary with changes to model capability, agent scaffold software, tool use, deployment method (including internal vs. external deployment), use case, use in"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "d software, tool use, deployment method (including internal vs. external deployment), use case, use in multi- agent systems, and otherwise? (c) How might technical controls, processes, and other practices need to change, in r"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "cal controls, processes, and other practices need to change, in response to the likely future evolution of AI agent system capabilities or of the threats, risks, or vulnerabilities facing them? (d) What are the methods, risks"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "s facing them? (d) What are the methods, risks, and other considerations relevant for patching or updating AI agent systems throughout the lifecycle, as distinct from those affecting both traditional software systems and non-"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "I? (e) Which cybersecurity guidelines, frameworks, and best practices are most relevant to the security of AI agent systems? i. What is the extent of adoption by AI agent system developers and deployers of these relevant guid"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "best practices are most relevant to the security of AI agent systems? i. What is the extent of adoption by AI agent system developers and deployers of these relevant guidelines, frameworks, and best practices? ii. What are im"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": ". Are there ways in which existing cybersecurity best practices may not be appropriate for the security of AI agent systems? 3. Assessing the Security of AI Agent Systems (a) What methods could be used during AI agent systems"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y best practices may not be appropriate for the security of AI agent systems? 3. Assessing the Security of AI Agent Systems (a) What methods could be used during AI agent systems development to anticipate, identify, and asses"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y of AI agent systems? 3. Assessing the Security of AI Agent Systems (a) What methods could be used during AI agent systems development to anticipate, identify, and assess security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities? i. What "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ty threats, risks, or vulnerabilities? i. What methods could be used to detect security incidents after an AI agent system has been deployed? ii. How do these align (or differ) from traditional information security practices,"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "lnerabilities? (b) Not all security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities are necessarily applicable to every AI agent system; how could the security of a particular AI agent system be assessed and what types of information coul"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ulnerabilities are necessarily applicable to every AI agent system; how could the security of a particular AI agent system be assessed and what types of information could help with that assessment? (c) What documentation or d"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ta from upstream developers of AI models and their associated components might aid downstream providers of AI agent systems in assessing, anticipating, and managing security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities in deployed AI a"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "t systems in assessing, anticipating, and managing security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities in deployed AI agent systems? i. Does this data or documentation vary between open-source and closed-source AI models and AI agent"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "agent systems? i. Does this data or documentation vary between open-source and closed-source AI models and AI agent systems, and if so, how? ii. What kinds of disclosures (if made mandatory or public) could potentially create"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "en parties to protect system integrity? (d) What is the state of practice for user-facing documentation of AI agent systems that support secure deployment? 4. Limiting, Modifying, and Monitoring Deployment Environments (a) AI"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "systems that support secure deployment? 4. Limiting, Modifying, and Monitoring Deployment Environments (a) AI agent systems may be deployed in a variety of environments, i.e., locations where the system's actions take place. "
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ystem's actions take place. In what manner and by what technical means could the access to or extent of an AI agent system's deployment environment be constrained? (b) How could virtual or physical environments be modified to"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ual or physical environments be modified to mitigate security threats, risks, or vulnerabilities affecting AI agent systems? What is the state of applied use in implementing undoes, rollbacks, or negations for unwanted action"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "backs, or negations for unwanted actions or trajectories [[Page 701]] (sequences of actions) of a deployed AI agent system? (c) What is the state of managing risks associated with interactions between AI agent systems and cou"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "f a deployed AI agent system? (c) What is the state of managing risks associated with interactions between AI agent systems and counterparties? Practices, their adoption, and their relative maturity may differ according to th"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "rding to the counterparty in the interaction, including: i. Interactions with humans who are not using the AI agent system directly; ii. Interactions with digital resources, including web services, servers, and legacy systems"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ing system access, source code access, or similar network-level access vectors; v. Interactions with other AI agent systems. (d) What methods could be used to monitor deployment environments for security threats, risks, or vu"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": ", or vulnerabilities? iii. What is the maturity of these methods in research and practice? (e) Are current AI agent systems widely deployed on the open internet, or in otherwise unbounded environments? How could the volume of"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "es, information, or tools would aid the AI ecosystem in the rapid adoption of security practices affecting AI agent systems and promoting the ecosystem of AI agent system security innovation? (b) In which policy or practice a"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "stem in the rapid adoption of security practices affecting AI agent systems and promoting the ecosystem of AI agent system security innovation? (b) In which policy or practice areas is government collaboration with the AI eco"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ation with the AI ecosystem most urgent or most likely to lead to improvements in the state of security of AI agent systems today and into the future? (c) In which critical areas should research be focused to improve the curr"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ich critical areas should research be focused to improve the current state of security practices affecting AI agent systems? i. Where should future research be directed in order to unlock the benefits of adoption of secure an"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ere should future research be directed in order to unlock the benefits of adoption of secure and resilient AI agent systems? ii. Which research approaches should be prioritized to advance the scientific understanding and miti"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ance the scientific understanding and mitigation of security threats, risks, and vulnerabilities affecting AI agent systems? (d) How are other countries addressing these challenges and what are the benefits and drawbacks of t"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "cial intelligence and cybersecurity that might benefit our understanding or assessments of the security of AI agent systems? Footnotes 1. Technical Blog: Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations, <a href=\"https://www.nist"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "derstanding or assessments of the security of AI agent systems? Footnotes 1. Technical Blog: Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations, <a href=\"https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "Hijacking Evaluations, <a href=\"https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai-agent-hijacking-evaluations\">https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai-agent-hi"
   },
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "ai-agent-hijacking-evaluations\">https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai-agent-hijacking-evaluations</a>. 2. Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigat"
   }
  ],
  "definition": "AI agent systems are capable of planning and taking autonomous actions that impact real-world systems or environments. AI agent systems consist of at least one generative AI model and scaffolding software that equips the model with tools to take a range of discretionary actions. These systems may be more expansive, containing multiple sub-agents with software that orchestrates their interactions. They can be deployed with little to no human oversight. Other terms used to refer to AI agent systems include AI agents and agentic AI. Challenges to the security of AI agent systems may undermine the"
 },
 "fr_hhs_onc": {
  "label": "HHS/ASTP-ONC proposed rule, 90 FR 61005-06 (Dec 29, 2025)",
  "file": "fr_hhs_onc.txt",
  "pages": null,
  "chars": 476506,
  "counts": {
   "agent": 1,
   "agentic": 10,
   "autonom*": 11,
   "AI system": 11
  },
  "agent_hits": [
   {
    "page": 0,
    "kwic": "y'') to act independently (analogous to a human ``having agency'' or power to do something) or function as an agent of its user. See, e.g., Merriam- Webster ``agentic'' (https://www.merriam-webster.com/slang/ agentic#:~:text="
   }
  ],
  "definition": "Autonomous artificial intelligence systems that are designed to execute complex tasks autonomously or with little human involvement to accomplish pre-determined goals is often referred to a ``agentic AI'' because these systems' capabilities involve them acting independently or having ability or means (``agency'') to act independently (analogous to a human ``having agency'' or power to do something) or function as an agent of its user. See, e.g., Merriam- Webster ``agentic'' (https://www.merriam-webster.com/slang/ agentic#:~:text=What%20does%20agentic%20mean?,(%E2%80%9Chaving%20agen cy%22)). See also, e.g., Acharya, et al, 2025, ``Agentic AI: Autonomous Intelligence for Complex Goals--A Compr"
 }
}